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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Gasoline Sales, Inc. ("Gas Sales") sued three related 
corporations and officers of two of the corporations.  Gas Sales 
alleged that the defendants injured Gas Sales in the course of 
violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
("RICO") chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.  The district court dismissed Gas Sales' 
second amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Gas Sales appeals from this dismissal.  It also appeals from the 
district court's ruling refusing to grant it leave to file a 
third amended complaint.  The primary question raised on appeal 
is whether Gas Sales has satisfied the "person/enterprise" 
pleading requirement which we have held applies in RICO suits 
premised on 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  See B.F. Hirsch v. Enright 
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984).  We hold that Gas 
Sales has failed to satisfy this requirement, and we will 
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
  
 I. 
 A. 
 Because the district court dismissed Gas Sales' second 
amended complaint at the pleading stage pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), we must consider whether relief could be granted to Gas 
Sales "under any set of facts that could be proved consistent 
with the allegations" in its complaint.  National Organization 
For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 
(1994) quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).  
The relevant allegations are as follows. 
 The defendants are a corporation, Getty Petroleum Corp. 
("Getty"); Getty's two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Aero Oil 
Company ("Aero"), and Reco Petroleum, Inc. ("Reco"); Getty's 
senior vice-president, Alvin Smith; and Aero's general manager, 
Jerry T. Lank.  Getty, Aero, and Reco are engaged in the leasing 
of retail gasoline stations and the sale of petroleum products.  
Getty acquired Aero in 1986, and acquired Reco on June 30, 1989. 
 Getty originally was incorporated under the name of 
Power Test Corporation ("Power Test"), but changed its name in 
1985.  Between 1982 and 1985, Getty -- then called Power Test -- 
violated New York State statutes by defrauding 182 New York 
gasoline-station lessees.  In 1986, the New York Attorney General 
filed a civil suit against Getty on behalf of the 182 lessees.  
Getty settled the suit for a large monetary payment.  
 In 1990, in the District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York, a Getty subdivision named Getty Terminals Corp. 
  
(which is not a party to this lawsuit) was convicted of tax 
evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States. 
 From 1986 to 1991, in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the 
defendants have engaged in a widespread fraudulent scheme, 
through the use of both mail and wire communications, to induce 
the plaintiff Gas Sales and at least twenty others to enter into 
retail-gasoline-station lease-agreements with the defendants.  
Once the lessees entered into the contracts, the defendants would 
embark on a course of fraudulent conduct designed to render the 
retail gasoline-stations unprofitable and thereby "squeeze" the 
lessees out of business. 
 B. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over Gas Sales' 
complaint pursuant to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 II. 
 A. 
 In 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), RICO provides a private civil 
right of action to "any person injured . . . by reason of a 
violation of" the substantive RICO provisions contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 1962.  Gas Sales alleges that it was injured by 
violations of one of these substantive provisions -- section 
1962(c).  A "person" violates section 1962(c) by conducting an 
  
"enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity.1  
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).  
"Racketeering activity" is defined by RICO as any of a host of 
enumerated crimes, including mail and wire fraud.  18 U.S.C.  
§ 1961(1).  "Pattern" is defined as the commission of at least 
two acts of "racketeering activity" within a ten-year period.   
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 
 The parties do not dispute whether Gas Sales has 
alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the "racketeering" and 
"pattern" elements of a section 1962(c) violation.  They dispute 
whether Gas Sales has alleged facts sufficient to establish that 
any of the defendants engaged in the "conduct of an enterprise."  
Since B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 
1984), we have held that to plead a claim successfully under 
section 1962(c), a complaint must be capable of being read to 
allege that a "person" was "conducting a pattern of racketeering 
through a separate and distinct enterprise."  Glessner v. Kenny, 
952 F.2d 702, 714 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Banks 
v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. 
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991); Brittingham 
                     
1
.   In its entirety, section 1962(c) states: "It shall be 
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt." 
  
v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1991); Lorenz v. CSX 
Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 & n.4; Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Gas Sales has pled that Getty, Lank, and Smith were 
"persons" who conducted the "enterprise" or "enterprises" of Aero 
and Reco.2  RICO's definitions of "person" and "enterprise" are 
quite broad.  Each includes human beings and legal entities, and 
"enterprise" also includes unofficial "associations" of human 
beings and/or legal entities.3  Thus, in RICO terms, any of the 
defendants could be a "person," and any of the defendants or any 
combination of the defendants could be an "enterprise."  However, 
under our precedents, none of the defendants is sufficiently 
distinct from the "enterprises" Aero and Reco to have conducted 
them within the meaning of section 1962(c). 
 1. 
 Only "persons" can be sued for violating RICO  
§ 1962(c).  Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 
F.2d 1349, 1358 n.* (3d Cir. 1987).  Because Gas Sales has 
alleged that Aero and Reco were conducted as "enterprises" in 
violation of section 1962(c), and because we have held that 
enterprises cannot conduct themselves within the meaning of 
                     
2
.  Gas Sales has not stated whether it alleges Reco and Aero 
constitute one or two enterprises. 
3
.  "Person" is defined to "include[ ] any individual entity 
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."  
18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).  "Enterprise" is defined to "include[ ] any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity."  18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 
  
section 1962(c), Gas Sales cannot sue Aero or Reco under section 
1962(c).  B.F. Hirsch v. Enright, 751 F.2d at 633-34; Banks v. 
Wolk, 918 F.2d at 421; Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1411.  For the 
same reason, Aero cannot be vicariously liable for any 1962(c) 
violation committed by Lank, its vice president, in conducting 
Aero through a pattern of racketeering.  Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 
1351, 1358-60; Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1411. 
 2. 
 We have also held that a corporation generally cannot 
be a defendant under section 1962(c) for conducting an 
"enterprise" consisting of its own subsidiaries or employees, or 
consisting of the corporation itself in association with its 
subsidiaries or employees.  Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 302-03; 
Glessner, 952 F.2d at 710-13; Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1411-13.  This is 
because we have interpreted corporate identity expansively, so 
that the actions of a corporation's agents conducting its normal 
affairs are constructively its own actions for section 1962(c) 
purposes.  Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 302; Glessner, 952 F.2d at 
710-12.  Under this "Brittingham rationale," Getty cannot be sued 
by Gas Sales for conducting its subsidiaries Aero and Reco any 
more than it could be sued for conducting itself. 
 We have hypothesized that a "narrow," "theoretical," 
and "rare" exception to the Brittingham rule might exist, when 
there are allegations that the defendant corporation "had a role 
in the racketeering activity that was distinct from the 
undertakings of those acting on its behalf."  Brittingham, 943 
F.2d at 302; see also Glessner, 952 F.2d at 712; Lorenz, 1. F.3d 
  
at 1413 n.4.  Gas Sales has not so alleged, however.  As the 
district court accurately recounted, Gas Sales has alleged that 
Getty and its two subsidiaries acted in concert in furtherance of 
a common scheme to defraud gasoline station lessees.  Gas Sales' 
complaints, far from distinguishing Getty's role in the scheme, 
closely identify Getty's actions with the actions of Aero and 
Reco. 
 3. 
 We have held that corporate employees who victimize 
their employer by draining it of its own money or using it as a 
passive tool to extract money from third parties are proper 
section 1962(c) defendants.  Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.  Where 
the employees merely participate in the corporation's own fraud 
by acting as corporate agents, however, the employees may not be 
sued under section 1962(c).  Id. at 713-14.  We have stated that 
this interpretation of 1962(c) "avoids the absurd result that a 
corporation may always be pled to be the enterprise controlled by 
its employees or officers."  Id. at 713. 
 Gas Sales has not alleged that Smith and Lank profited 
personally from the conducting of Getty, Aero, or Reco's affairs 
beyond the compensation they receive for their services to the 
corporation or that they acted as anything other than Getty and 
Aero's agents.  Gas Sales therefore cannot sue Smith and Lank 
under section 1962(c). 
  
 B. 
 The third amended (i.e. fourth) complaint that Gas 
Sales seeks to file, minimizes any allegation of an active 
racketeering role by the subsidiaries Aero and Reco, and also 
includes a new legal theory of liability for violation of RICO  
§ 1962(b).4  The district court refused to permit the filing of 
the amendment because it was repetitive, or, in the alternative, 
because it was futile.  This was not an abuse of discretion.  See 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1413-
14; Glessner, 952 F.2d at 714. 
 First, as the district court stated, "three attempts at 
a proper pleading is enough," and a "plaintiff has to carefully 
consider the allegations to be placed in a complaint before it is 
filed."  Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 12.  Gas Sales is not seeking to 
add claims it inadvertently omitted from its prior complaints or 
which it did not know about earlier.  Rather, Gas Sales is 
modifying its allegations in hopes of remedying factual 
deficiencies in its prior pleadings, even to the point of 
contradicting its prior pleadings. 
 Second, regarding Gas Sales' section 1962(c) theory of 
liability, the third amended complaint still contains sufficient 
                     
4
.  18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) states: "It shall be unlawful for any 
person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through 
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly 
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which 
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce."  Anyone injured by reason of a violation of 
section 1962(b), may sue the violator pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1964(c). 
  
allegations of concerted behavior by Getty, Aero, and Reco that 
it fails to establish that Getty played a distinctive and 
separate role in the alleged racketeering activity.   
 Finally, regarding section 1962(b), we have not yet 
decided whether the "person/enterprise" distinction is a 
necessary element of a violation of that section.  Lightning 
Lube, 4 F.3d at 1190-91.  Nonetheless, we need not resolve the 
issue now, because proof of a violation of that section requires 
a showing that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's 
acquisition or control of an interest in an enterprise through 
racketeering.  Id. at 1189-91.  Gas Sales does not allege in its 
third amended complaint that it was injured by Getty's 
acquisition or maintenance of control over Aero and Reco, or that 
Getty's acquisition or maintenance of control over these 
subsidiaries was accomplished through racketeering.  It would be 
futile, therefore, to permit Gas Sales to file its third amended 
complaint on section 1962(b) grounds. 
 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
 
 
  
                                                                   
